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ARTICLES
BOOTH v. MARYLAND. SILENCING
THE VICTIM IN THE SENTENCING
PROCEEDING
The eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment contained in the United States Constitution1 has been
prevalent throughout history.' Although the death penalty' has
I See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which provides that "[Ejxcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. See
also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."). See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257
(1972) (fourteenth amendment prohibits states from inflicting cruel and unusual punish-
ments); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 542 (1968) (state infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments violates fourteenth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 n.6 (1964)
(ban against cruel and unusual punishment applies to states through fourteenth amend-
ment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (protections against the federal
government have become valid against states through fourteenth amendment); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (prohibitions of eighth amendment apply to states
through due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462-63 (1947) (fourteenth amendment prohibits states from in-
flicting cruel and unusual punishments).
I See Exodus 21:25. The prohibition of excessive punishment was first expressed in the
Old Testament of the Bible in the book of Exodus. Id. One of the laws given to Moses by
God was "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." Id. In his book, Block notes that "[t]he
Code of Hammurabi is one of the first known laws to have recognized the concept of an
'eye for an eye', and consequently to have accepted death as an appropriate punishment for
homicide." E. BLoat, AND MAY GOD HAVE MERCv . . . 13-14 (1962). See also ARISTOTLE,
ETmcs 148-49 (Penguin Classics ed. 1955) (concern for equality of crime and punishment
was also expressed in early Greek philosophy).
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" has its origin in English law. W.& M., 2d.
Sess. (1689). In his article, Anthony Granucci notes that this very phrase was included in
the English Bill of Rights, enacted December 16, 1689, which reads: "That excessive bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 849 (1969). Many historians believe that the treason trials of 1685 -
the "Bloody Assizes" - spurred the adoption of the Bill of Rights which contains the very
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commanded much scrutiny under this constitutional provision, the
constitutionality of this punishment has been well settled by the
Supreme Court.4 The High Court does however continuously ex-
words used in the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., I B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 71, 276 (1971) (believes the
truth of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" and its inclusion in the Bill of Rights
was due in part to the "Bloody Assizes").
The precise language used in the eighth amendment first appeared in America on June
12, 1776, in Virginia's "Declaration of Rights." Granucci, supra, at 840. "Following its
inclusion in the Virginia constitution, eight other states adopted the clause, the federal
government inserted it into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and it became the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791." Id. In Furman, Justice Marshall
noted there was no doubt that in borrowing this language from the English Bill of Rights
and including it in our Constitution that our Founding Fathers intended to outlaw torture
and other cruel punishments. Furman, 408 U.S. at 319 (Marshall, J., concurring), But see
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971) (common-law rule imposed
mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers).
1 See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 651, 493 P.2d 880, 896, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
167-68, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972). The death penalty is said to serve three principle
social purposes: retribution and deterrence of a capital crime by prospective offenders as
well as the incapacitaton of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of future
crimes they may commit. Id. One author has recognized that to a certain degree, capital
punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particular offensive conduct. H.
PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 43-44 (1968). The Court agreed with this pro-
position and noted that the very decision "that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are
'themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate reponse may be the
penalty of death." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976).
4 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169. The Court held that the punishment of death does not
invariably violate the Constitution. Id. at 169. See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976) (upholding Texas' guided discretion death penalty statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 247 (1976) (Court rejected petitioner's argument that imposition of the death
penalty under any circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment).
"It is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself that the existence of capital pun-
ishment was accepted by the Framers." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177. "Indeed, the First Congress
of the United States enacted legislation providing death as the penalty for specified
crimes." Id. The fifth amendment, adopted at the same time as the eighth, and the four-
teenth amendment adopted over three quarters of a century later, also contemplated the
continued existence of this punishment by the limits they impose. Id. The Supreme Court
has held for over 200 years that the death penalty, when benefitting the offense, is not
cruel and unusual punishment per se. Id. at 178.
Several Supreme Court Justices have even expressed their individual opinions concern-
ing the constitutionality of the death penalty. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 226 (1971) (separate opinion of Black, J.) (cruel and unusual punishment cannot be
construed to prohibit capital punishment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (Warren,
C.J.) (capital punishment cannot be said to violate constitutional concepts of cruelty); Id. at
125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (words cruel and unusual punishment should not be read
broadly to give them meaning beyond their intended scope). But see Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (Warren, C.J.) ("[T]he existence of the death penalty is not a license to
the government to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of the imagina-
tion"); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473 (1947) (Burton, J., dissent-
ing) ("Taking human life by unnecessarily cruel means shocks the most fundamental in-
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amine the methods by which the penalty is imposed by the lower
courts.5 The Supreme Court has decided that where sentencing
discretion is granted in a capital case, the scope of information to
be considered by the sentencing body should not be limited." One
stincts of civilized man.").
' See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982). "'Beginning with Furman, the
Court has attempted to provide standards for a constitutional death penalty that would
serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused." Id. See
also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The plurality held that mandatory
death sentencing was not a constitutionally valid response to the Court's fear of arbitrary
death sentencing. Id. at 305. "[T~he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment. . .requires consideration of the character and record of the individ-
ual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensa-
ble part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Id. at 304. See, e.g., Roberts
(Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977) (principles stated above applied in capital
sentencing decision); Roberts (Stanislaus) v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (mandatory
death sentence rejected - sentence needs to be individualized).
"[Tihe concept of individualized sentencing in criminal cases generally, although not
constitutionally required, has long been accepted in this country." Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 602 (1978). See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) (circum-
stances of the offense as well as the character and propensities of the offender must be
considered by the sentencing authority). The Court recognized that classification of crimes
does not automatically determine a penalty. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585
(1959). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(19th century movement away from mandatory death penalties is rooted in the recognition
"that individual culpability is not always measured by the category of the crime commit-
ted."); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) ("For the determina-
tion of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts
by which the crime was committed.").
The Court held that the sentencing process must satisfy the requirements of the due
process clause. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). The defendant has a valid
interest in the quality of the proceeding which determines the sentence which he is to
receive even though he has no right to request or to object to a particular result in the
sentencing process. See generally Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968) (de-
fendant is entitled to an impartial objective sentencing proceeding as part of his right to
due process of law).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1982). "No limitation shall be placed on the information con-
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which
a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing the
appropriate sentence." Id. See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (it is essential
during capital sentencing proceedings that the jury have before it all possible relevant in-
formation about individual defendant whose fate it must determine); Gregg v. United
States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969) ("no formal limitations on [the] contents [of presentence
reports], and they may rest on hearsay and contain information bearing no relation whatso-
ever to the crime with which the defendant is charged"); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949) (where sentencing discretion is granted the sentencing authority's "posses-
sion of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics is
highly relevant - if not essential - to the selection of an appropriate sentence .... ");
Warner & Cabot, Changes In The Administration Of Criminal Justice During The Past Fifty
Years, 50 HARv. L. REV. 538, 607 (1937) (judge should have greater information so he can
act more intelligently); Note, Reform In Federal Penal Procedure: The Federal Corrections And
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source of information considered by courts in the past has been
Victim Impact Statements (VIS)." Recently, however, in Booth v.
Maryland,8 the Supreme Court held a Maryland statute9 unconsti-
tutional insofar as it required the sentencing authority 0 in a capi-
tal case to consider VIS.
In Booth, Irwin Bronstein, 78, and his wife Rose, 75, were
robbed and murdered in their West Baltimore home."1 The mur-
derers, John Booth and Willie Reid, bound and gagged the vic-
Parole Improvement Bills, 53 YALE L.J. 773, 775 (1944) (accompanying great discretion
should be wide range of information about defendant to better enable judge to impose
proper sentence).
Although the lack of limitations may seem prejudicial to the defendant, the requirement
of accurate information is rooted in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Con-
stitution provides that -[N]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law." Id. The Court held that as applied to sentencing, due process has
come to require that sentences be based on accurate information. Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948). The Court also recognized in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976), that the death penalty is qualitatively different, both in severity and irrev-
ocability, from any other potential punishment and therefore demands the highest degree
of reliability. Id. at 305.
' See McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRiM. L. BuLL 501, 508 (1986). The
victim impact statement (VIS) is introduced at the sentencing hearing, most often as an
attachment to the presentence report. Id. A presentence report is defined as a document
prepared by a probation officer that contains information for use by the sentencing author-
ity. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (5th ed. 1979). The most common form of VIS is de-
scribed as one which includes objective data on the effects of the crime on the victim.
McLeod, supra, at 503. Legislatures have generally identified a victim as any person against
whom a crime has been committed or who has suffered harm as a result of criminal activ-
ity, thereby including the victim's family. Id. at 509. The author hereinafter adopts this
definition of victim throughout the Article.
Although the VIS focuses primarily on the victim it also retains procedural protections
for the defendant. Posner, Victim Impact Statements and Restitution: Making the Punishment Fit
the Victim, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 301, 308 (1984). 18 U.S.C. § 3580(c) requires that the VIS
be disclosed to the defendant. Id. "The court shall disclose to both the defendant and the
attorney for the Government all portions of the presentence or other report pertaining to
the matters described in subsection (a) of this Section". Id.
* 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
* See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609 (1986).
10 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (b) (1982) reads in pertinent part:
This proceeding shall be conducted: (1) Before the jury that determined the defend-
ant's guilt; or (2) Before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the proceeding if: (i)
The defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (ii) The defendant was convicted
after a trial before the court sitting without a jury; (iii) The jury that determined the
defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause; or (iv) Review of
the original sentence of death by a court of competent jurisdiction has resulted in a
remand or resentencing; or (3) Before the court alone; if a jury sentencing proceed-
ing is waived by the defendant.
Id.
" Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2530.
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tims and then repeatedly stabbed them in the chest with a kitchen
knife. 2 The bodies were found two days later by the Bronsteins'
son. 3 Booth was convicted in the Circuit Court, Baltimore City,
where a jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree mur-
der, two counts of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery."
At the sentencing proceeding the prosecution requested the death
penalty,18 and Booth chose to have his sentence decided by the
jury"' as opposed to the trial judge. The jury was instructed to
consider all the relevant evidence including the VIS.1 7 After delib-
eration, the jury sentenced Booth to death for the murder of Mr.
Bronstein and to life imprisonment for the murder of Mrs.
Bronstein."8
The Maryland trial court denied defense counsel's motion to
suppress the VIS and held that the jury was entitled to consider
any and all evidence which would bear on the sentencing deci-
sion.19 On automatic appeal,20 the Maryland Court of Appeals af-
Is Id. The murderers entered the victims' home for the apparent purpose of stealing
money to buy heroin. Id. Booth, however, was a neighbor and knew the elderly couple
could identify him so he killed them. Id.
" See Booth v. Maryland, 306 Md. 172, 173, 507 A.2d 1098, 1103 (1986).
14 Id. at 174, 507 A.2d at 1125. Booth's accomplice, Willie Reid, was convicted and sen-
tenced to death as the principal in the first degree for the murder of Mrs. Bronstein. Id.
The conviction was affirmed and his sentence is currently under review. See Reid v. State,
305 Md. 9, 501 A.2d 436 (1985).
15 Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2530. Under the Maryland Annotated Code there are alternative
punishments for persons found quilty of first degree murder: "A person found guilty of
murder in the first degree shall be sentenced either to death or to imprisonment for life."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(b) (1982).
"6 See Booth, 306 Md. at 174, 507 A.2d at 1103. The Court recognized that a jury has
the authority to sentence a defendant convicted of first-degree murder to death without
violating the eighth amendment, as long as certain procedural safeguards are in place to
"guide" and "channel" the jury's discretion. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 935, 950 (1983).
17 Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2532. The VIS in this case was based on interviews with the Bron-
steins' son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. Id. Many of their comments empha-
sized the victims' personal qualities, and noted how deeply the Bronsteins would be missed.
Id. Other parts of the VIS described the emotional and personal problems that the family
had faced as a result of the crimes. Id.
18 Id.
10 Booth, 306 Md. at 174, 507 A.2d at 1124. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (any
and all relevant information should be presented to the sentencing authority for their
consideration).
20 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(a) (1982) which provides in pertinent part: "when-
ever the death penalty is imposed, and the judgment becomes final, the court of appeals
shall review the sentence on the record." Id.
Victim Impact Statements
firmed the conviction and the sentences."' The majority found
that the impact of the crime on the victim was a relevant circum-
stance surrounding the commission of the offense and was, there-
fore, admissible as part of the presentence report."' The court re-
viewed the VIS and found it to be an objective statement as to the
effects the crime had on the victim's family." The court was also
satisfied that the sentence of death for Booth was not imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor."
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell stated that the introduc-
tion of a VIS at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial
violates the eighth amendment hence the Court ruled the Mary-
land statute invalid to the extent that it requires consideration of
this information.2 5 Addressing the nature of the information con-
tained in a VIS, the majority held that its introduction creates an
impermissible risk that capital sentencing will be done in an arbi-
" See Booth, 306 Md. at 174, 507 A.2d at 1125.
s Id. at 174, 507 A.2d at 1124. The court of appeals relied on Lodowski v. State, 302
Md. 691, 735-42, 490 A.2d 1228, 1251-54 (1985). In Lodowski, the court, after careful
analysis of the legislative history of victim impact evidence, held that it was clear that the
legislature did not believe that victim impact evidence was an arbitrary factor in the sen-
tencing process. Id. at 735-42, 490 A.2d at 1252. The Lodowski court recognized that the
statute requiring the consideration of victim impact evidence in capital cases, Art. 41, §
124, was reenacted in 1983 despite Art. 27, § 414(e)(1) which deals with "arbitrary fac-
tors." Id. at 736, 490 A.2d at 1252. The court also examined the purpose of the
presentence report and concluded that information regarding the victim is included in the
objective of providing the sentencing authority with "a complete description of the offense
and the circumstances surrounding it." Id. (quoting ABA COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORREC-
TION AT LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS, PROBATION STANDARDS § 2.3(ii)(A) (1972 & Supp.
1975).
" See Booth, 306 Md. at 175, 507 A.2d at 1124.
, See id. See.also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e)(1) (1982) which provides:
In addition to the consideration of any errors properly before the Court on ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals shall consider the imposition of the death sentence. With
regard to the sentence the Court shall determine: (1) Whether the sentence of death
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor; ....
Id.; Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2536 (court held introduction of VIS could serve no purpose other
than to inflame jury and divert their attention away from relevant issues and defendant
thereby prejudicing him).
" Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2536. The Court in Booth found that a state statute which allows
consideration of factors other than the defendant's record, the defendant's characteristics,
and circumstances of the crime, must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that such informa-
tion has a bearing on the defendant's personal responsibilty and moral guilt. Id. at 2533.
See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (punishment must be tailored to
defendant's responsibility and moral guilt).
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trary manner."" In addition, the majority concluded that the de-
gree to which a family is willing and able to express its grief is
irrelevant to the sentencing decision and its consideration would
result in a shift of the focus of the sentencing proceeding away
from the defendant."7 Finally, the Court recognized that while the
" Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2534. In Godfrey v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that if a
state wishes to impose capital punishment, it has a constitutional responsibility to apply the
law in such a way as to avoid the "arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty."
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). The Supreme Court further held that any
decision to impose the death sentence must "be, and appear to be, based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). See also Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (discretion of sentencing body in capital case must be
directed to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious action); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (penalty of death cannot be imposed under
sentencing procedures which create the risk of punishment being inflicted "unusually" in
an arbitrary and capricious manner).
Hence the Court in Booth found that admission of a VIS during the sentencing phase of a
capital murder trial "is irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision," and "creates a constitu-
tionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and
capricious manner." Booth 107 S. Ct. at 2534. But see Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 740,
490 A.2d 1228, 1253-54 (1985) (victim impact statement relevant in a capital sentencing
proceeding as an objective factor surrounding the defendant and the offense).
The Court in Booth noted, however, that victim impact statements may be relevant and
admissible in other contexts and for other purposes. Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2535 n.10. For
example, such information may be admissible because it directly relates to the facts and
circumstances of the crime. Id. Further, there may be times when the victim's personal
charcteristics are relevant to the proceeding. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 404(a)(2) (prosecutor
may show victim had peaceable nature to rebut charge that victim was aggressor). Discre-
tion still vests in the trial judge in deciding when such information is sufficiently relevant to
the proceeding, and when its probative value outweighs any potential prejudicial effect.
Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2535 n.10.
3" Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2534. The Court was concerned that when the VIS is used, an
inference can be drawn that defendants whose victims were assets to the community are
more deserving of punishment than defendants whose victims were not perceived as such.
Id. at 2534 n.8.
As one court, in People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d. 500, 516-17, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276,
287-88 (1984), recently stated:
The purpose of sentencing is to punish defendants in accordance with their level of
culpability . . . . [A] defendant's level of culpability depends not on fortuitous cir-
cumstances such as the composition of his victim's family, but on circumstances over
which he has control . . . . [The fact that a victim's family is irredeemably be-
reaved] is relevant to damages in a civil action, but it has no relationship to the
proper purposes of sentencing in a criminal case.
Id. In his concurring opinion in Lodowski, Judge Cole wrote that to allow this evidence into
a capital sentencing proceeding injects factors that have nothing to do with the defendant's
level of culpability in the offense for which he is being sentenced. See Lodowski v. State,
302 Md. at 746, 490 A.2d at 1269 (Cole, J., concurring). The Supreme Court in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968), has expressly interpreted the eighth amend-
ment as requiring the jury when determining the sentence in a capital case to focus on the
defendant as a uniquely individual human being. Id.
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defendant had a statutory and constitutional right to rebut the in-
formation, he would rarely be able to prove that the family mem-
bers had exaggerated their emotional pain and suffering. 8
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that while some
of the information contained in a VIS may be inappropriate, this
was not an inherent fault in all victim impact statements." Justice
White concluded that most information contained in VIS was-ap-
propriate evidence for capital sentencing proceedings, since the
state had a valid interest in rebutting the mitigating evidence in-
troduced by the defendant, and therefore, admission of the VIS
during such proceeding is not unconstitutional per se.30
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia found that the
information contained in a VIS concerning the amount of harm
the defendant had caused bears upon the extent of his "personal
responsibility." 3' He determined that, as such, the VIS is a rele-
vant factor to be considered consistent with the attempt to indi-
vidualize the sentencing process.8 2
Although the Booth majority has sought to maintain an objective
standard for the imposition of the death penalty, it is submitted
that the Court erred in formulating a rigid rule calling for the
See Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2535. The Court did not anticipate a procedural problem
concerning the defendant's ability to cross examine the family members, but recognized
that the defendant's ability to rebut the victim impact evidence regarding the degree of
sleeplessness, depression or emotional trauma suffered would be difficult if not impossible.
Id. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(v) (1982). The defendant's right to rebut all
information proffered is guaranteed by the Maryland death penalty statute which provides
that all evidence is admissible which the "court deems of probative value and relevant to
the sentence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any state-
ments." Id.
", Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2541 (White, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 2539 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White further maintained that "if punish-
ment can be enhanced in non-capital cases on the basis of harm caused, irrespective of the
offender's specific intention to cause such harm," the same approach should not be uncon-
stitutional in capital cases. Id. at 2540. See also Lodowski, 302 Md. at 736, 490 A.2d at 1252
n.5 (legislature has expressly authorized consideration of victim impact evidence in non-
capital cases).
31 See Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2541 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.
Ct. 1676, 1680 (1987) (defendants were sentenced to death not because of their degree of
blameworthiness, but because of their "personal responsibility, i.e., .. . the degree of
harm that they had caused."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (defendant's
sentence must be made to suit his personal responsibility and moral guilt).
" Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Lodowski, 302 Md. at 737,
490 A.2d at 1254 (reasonable nexus between impact of offense upon victim's family and
facts and circumstances surrounding crime).
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total exclusion of VIS at all capital sentencing proceedings. This
article will discuss the rationale supporting the admissibility of
VIS at capital sentencing proceedings, and discuss the advantages
of victim participation in the sentencing phase of criminal
prosecutions.
Booth v. Maryland: UNNECESSARY PROCEDURAL REFORM
The Booth holding does not address the procedural safeguards
found in the Maryland death penalty statute designed to insure
against arbitrary capital sentencing." These safeguards eliminate
the need for disqualifying certain relevant evidence on the basis of
potential arbitrariness." The statute lists several factors for the
" See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412-14 (1986). The statute provides the following three
provisions which guard against the concerns raised by the Court in Booth. First, a bifur-
cated trial is required so that guilt and punishment will be separately decided. Id. at §
413(a). Second, imposition of the death penalty is restricted to cases in which certain aggra-
vating circumstances are established and where the sentencing authority has considered
any existing mitigating circumstances. Id. at § 413(d)-(g). Finally, an expedited appellate
review of all death sentences is required as a check against the random or arbitrary imposi-
tion of the death penalty. Id. at § 414(a). See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(Court upheld Texas death penalty statute requiring similiar safeguards); Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (Court upheld Florida death penalty statute containing similar
provisions); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (Court upheld Georgia death penalty
statute containing these three safeguards).
An additional safeguard in the Maryland statute requires that the determination of the
court or jury be in writing, and, if a jury, it should be unanimous and signed by the fore-
man. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(i). To further aid the court's review of the determina-
tion to impose the death penalty, the statute clearly outlines what the appellate court
should consider. Id. at § 414(e). This section provides:
In addition to the consideration of any errors properly before the court on appeal,
the Court of Appeals shall consider the imposition of the death sentence. With re-
gard to the sentence, the Court shall determine: (1) Whether the sentence was im-
posed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2)
Whether the evidence supports the jury's or court's finding of a statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance under § 413(d); (3) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or
court's finding that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating
circumstances; and (4) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportion-
ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considetring both the crime and the
defendant.
Id.
' See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Barclay,
the Court recognized a common theme among Supreme Court decisions putting "emphasis
on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the death penalty will be im-
posed in a consistent, rational manner." Id. In other words, the Supreme Court's decisions
have made it clear that states may impose the ultimate sentence of death "only if they
follow procedures that are designed to insure reliability in sentencing determinations." Id.
at 958. But see California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 840 (1987) (Court held "by limiting the
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jury's consideration during the sentencing process in an attempt
to guide the jury's discretion. 5 These procedural safeguards in-
sure that the constitutional standards for imposing the punish-
ment of death3 are sufficiently satisfied. 7 With respect to capital
jury's sentencing considerations to record evidence, the state also ensures the availability of
meaningful judicial review, another safeguard that improves reliability of the sentencing
process."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 n.12 (1978) (court's retain their traditional
authority "to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character,
prior record, or the circumstances of his offense"); Roberts v. Lousiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335
n. II (1976) (evidence outside the record concerning sentencing consequences is not sub-
stantiated and therefore no judicial review to safeguard against capricious sentencing de-
terminations can be had).
" See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (d)&(g) (1986). The statute provides a list of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances which the jury shall consider in determining whether
or not to impose ihe death sentence. Examples of aggravating circumstances include: if the
victim was a law enforcement officer who was murdered in the performance of his duties, §
413 (d)(1), if the defendant committed the murder while incarcerated, § 413 (dX2), if the
defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of
the same incident, § 413 (d)(9). Examples of mitigating circumstances include: if the de-
fendant has no record, 413 (g)(IXi), if the victim was a participant in the defendant's con-
duct and consented to the act which caused his death, § 413 (g)(2), if the defendant acted
under substantial duress, domination or provocation of another person, (but not so sub-
stantial as to operate as a complete defense to the prosecution), § 413 (gX3).
" See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). The con-
stitutional test for the validity of any punishment under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment is a cumulative one: (1) if a punishment is unusually se-
vere, (2) if it is likely that it is being inflicted arbitrarily, (3) if the punishment does not
coincide with the accepted social standards of the time, and (4) if there is no reason to
believe that it serves some necessary function that a less severe punishment could not serve,
then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment. Id. In Furman, the Court also noted that punishment is
cruel and unusual, and, therefore, in violation of the eighth amendment if it does not coin-
cide with human dignity. Id. at 270.
From the state court opinion in Booth we learn that the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments require two basic safeguards in capital sentencing proceedings, which form the mod-
ern death penalty statutes. Booth v. Maryland, 306 Md. 172, 176, 507 A.2d 1098, 1128
(1986) (Cole, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). First the death penalty "must not
be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that it [will] be in-
flicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. Second, capital sentencing procedures
must "guide and focus the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circum-
stances of the individual offense and the individual offender." Id. See, e.g., Roberts v. Loui-
siana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (invalidating Louisiana's statute making death the
mandatory punishment for all first-degree murderers); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (invalidating North Carolina's statute making death mandatory for
first-degree murderers); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (upholding Texas'
guided discretion death penalty statute requiring the jury to find one statutory aggravating
factor before death could be imposed); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976)
(upholding Florida's guided discretion sentencing statute in which aggravating circum-
stances are weighed against mitigating circumstances by the sentencer); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (upholding Georgia's guided discretion statute for the death pen-
alty). But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1778 (1987) (quoting Singer v. United
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punishment, the Supreme Court has moved away from mandatory
death sentences and toward individualized sentencing, thus ad-
vancing towards a flexible sentencing process." However, it is
submitted that the Booth decision has taken a step away from indi-
vidualized sentencing by implementing a rigid rule prohibiting the
consideration of certain relevant evidence by the sentencing au-
thority in all capital cases.
A. Absence of Deference to Legislative Determination
The majority in Booth has also failed to give the required defer-
ence to the legislature's determinations of what constitutes appro-
priate sentencing considerations. 3' Appropriate sentences for par-
States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (sentencing considerations should be limited to record
evidence)).
" See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1970). In Gregg, the Court stated that "the
concerns. . . that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance. Id. at 195. See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring) (standardless jury discretion must be replaced by procedures that
safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death sentence); Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958-59 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (sentencer's discretion must
be guided in a constitutionally adequate way); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303 (1976) (must replace arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to
guide and regulate process for imposing death sentence).
Therefore, the sentencer's discretion in a capital sentence proceeding must be channeled
and guided by clear, specific, and objective standards. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
428 (1980). See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (Florida's capital sentencing
proceeding provided specific and detailed guidelines); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(Texas' death sentencing procedures provided sentencing authority with clear and specific
guidelines); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (Louisiana's death sentencing proce-
dures lacked standards to guide jury and were therefore deemed unconstitutional).
" See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Thus in
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273-74 (1976), the Court noted that the proper focus in a
capital sentencing proceeding must be upon the circumstances "of the individual of-
fender". Id. See also supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text (recent trend towards flexi-
ble, individual sentencing proceedings).
" See Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2539 (White, J., dissenting). See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 468
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The task of judging constitational cases .. .must surely be
approached with the deepest humility and genuine deference to legislative judgment.");
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119-21 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (courts are not
representative bodies, and thus, in a democratic society, it is the legislature's responsibility
to respond to the will and ultimately the moral values of the people); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("History teaches that the
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when the courts become embroiled in the
passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing polit-
ical, economic and social pressures.").
In Furman, Justice Rehnquist realized that the judiciary's invalidation of certain laws
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ticular crimes and appropriate sentencing considerations are
clearly questions of legislative policy. 0 In addition, legislative
judgment is presumed to embody the contemporary standards of
society, and this presumption can only be overcome by clear and
convincing legislative error."' Court decisions indicate that those
who attempt to invalidate the judgment of the people's elected
representatives must meet a heavy burden."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White recognized that the leg-
islature had decided that a jury should have the information con-
tained in a VIS.' 3 Although he did not address the prejudicial ef-
fects of the VIS in the sentencing process, Justice White explained
that this information would aid the sentencing body to completely
evaluate the harm caused by the defendant.'4 It is clear that the
Maryland legislature, and other state legislatures, who have incor-
porated the requirement of the victim impact evidence in their
death penalty statutes, have attempted to insure that some consid-
eration be given to the victims of certain types of crimes.' 5 It is
duly enacted by the people's representatives because they are constitutionally insulted by
this responsiveness to popular will makes a democratic society, by the people and for the
people, unworkable. Furman, 408 U.S. at 466 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (information on federalism and the neces-
sity for separation of powers and judicial review).
40 See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). The apportionment of crimes
and punishments is not an area into which the judiciary is constitutionally authorized to
enter. Id. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (quoting Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)) (the deference owed to the legislature by the Court
"[u]nder our federal system is enhanced where the specification of punishment is con-
cerned, for those are peculiar questions of legislative policy"); Furman, 408 U.S. at 431
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("The designation of punishments for crimes is a matter peculiarly
within the sphere of the state and federal legislative bodies."). See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (courts are not to determine the wisdom of any statute, it must rely on
Congress - the courts must simply examine the constitutionality of the statute); In re Kem-
mler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (it is for the legislature to provide sentences for crimes -
the court is only to examine their constitutionality whether they agree with the punishment
or not).
" See Furman, 408 U.S. at 384. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 175 (1976) ("lI]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected
legislature against the constitutional measure" the court will "presume its validity."); Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (legislative
measure imposing specific punishments for crimes are not to be set aside by the courts
unless there is no reasonable basis for it).
"' See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
4' Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2539 (White, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 253940 (White, J., dissenting).
4* See Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 736, 490 A.2d 1228, 1256 (1985). "It is evident
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not surprising that in an age where there is a growing tide of sup-
port for victim justice that victim impact legislation would be
enacted."'
Although legislative power to determine sentences is exclusive,
it is not absolute.' The court does play a role in interpreting the
constitutionality of certain punishments. 8 The court serves as a
check on the legislative power to apportion crimes and punish-
ments.' 9
B. Sentencing Discretion and the Jury
It is submitted that an inflexible rule disqualifying all VIS from
consideration by a capital sentencing authority merely because
their value as evidence is within the discretion of the jury is an
that the legislative intent in enacting victim impact statement legislation was to establish
minimum standards for the information to be provided to judges and to make this informa-
tion available in as many cases as fiscal constraints allowed." Id. See also Booth, 107 S. Ct. at
2540 (White, J., dissenting) (victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to
which consideration should be given).
" See Lodowski, 302 Md. at 736, 490 A.2d at 1256. See also Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2542(Scalia, J., dissenting) (rise in popular concern for "victims' rights" has lead to an increase
in victim impact legislation ); E. ZIEGENHAGEN, VICTIMS, CRIME, AND SOCIAL CONTROL, 91
(1977) ("Current interest in individual victims of crime has been expressed by many groups
', See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 n.19. Legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen
representatives are an important factor in determining contemporary social values but they
are not determinative. Id. In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1910) the
Court expressed its fear that unlimited legislative power to impose punishments is the most
"potent instrument of cruelty... put into the hands of power." Id. In Furman, more than
sixty years later, the Court expressed this fear again by recognizing the necessity of re-
straining legislative power. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258-69 (1972). See also Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1773 (1987) (legislature is not without limits where
community values have demonstrated opposition to the death penalty). See, e.g., Crocker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (Court held a state may not constitutionally impose the
death penalty upon a defendant convicted of raping an adult woman).
" See, e.g., Gregg 428 U.S. at 174 ("It seems conceded by all that the amendment im-
poses some obligation on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of the punishment and
that there are punishments that the amendment would bar whether legislatively approved
or not.") (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring)); Furman , 408 U.S.
at 267 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he responsibilty lies with the courts to make certain
that the prohibition of the Clause is enforced."); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
526 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (although the courts must allow the "full scope of
governmental discretion," its main focus is on the fairness and the constitutionality of the
punishment in question).
" See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-75. The courts main function when assessing the constitu-
tionality of a particular punishment is to "insure that constitutional bounds are not over-
reached .. ." Id. See also supra note 48 (functions of judiciary in determining validity of
punishments imposed by legislature).
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unfair and unnecessary exclusion of the victim from the sentenc-
ing proceeding. Discretion is an indispensible ingredient in the
sentencing process." The moral, factual and legal judgments of
each juror should play a meaningful role in the sentencing deci-
sion. 51 Each juror is expected to exercise his discretion in light of
his common experiences and knowledge.52 Faith may be placed in
the jurors to put aside their personal bias and to administer justice
objectively and equitably.'
" See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1769 (1987). The Court noted that the
implementation of laws against murder "necessarily requires discretionary judgement." Id.
In addition, the Court held that because discretion is an indispensable part of the justice
system a very high standard of proof must be met when one claims that it has been abused.
d.
The Supreme Court has stated that "(als long as that sentencing authority's discretion is
guided in a constitutionally adequate way . . . and as long as the decision is not so wholly
arbitrary as to offend the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment cannot and should not de-
mand more." Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950-51 (1983). See also California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983) (jury can consider a "myriad of factors to determine whether
death is the appropriate punishment" after all elements of the capital crime have been
proven beyond reasonable doubt); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (discretion
of jury in a capital sentencing must be guided to reduce risk of "arbitrary and capricious
action"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (in capital cases "discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to limit the risk of solely arbitrary and capricious action"). But see McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (the task of developing standards and guidelines for
channeling jury discretion "and to express these characteristics in language that can be
fully understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability."); MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2d. § 6, comment 3 at 71 (Text
Draft No. 9, 1959) ("factors which determine whether the sentence of death is the appro-
priate penalty in particular cases are too complex to be compressed within the limits of a
simple formula .... ").
" See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950. The majority in Barclay stated that the Supreme Court
has never suggested that the sentencing process be a "rigid and mechanical" practice of
simply weighing statutory factors. Id. But see California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 840
(1987) ( Supreme Court has never held "that conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion,
or public feeling should properly play any role in the jury's sentencing determination.").
a' See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 950. The Court recognized that sentencing without judgment
is both impossible and undesirable. Id. The Court stated that such an important decision
cannot be made in a vacuum, as if the juror had no experiences. Id.
e' See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971). See, e.g., Barclay, 463 U.S. at
950 ("We expect that sentencers will exercise their discretion in their own way and to the
best of their ability"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) ("A man who
opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judg-
ment entrusted to him by the state and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror."); Cf.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113 (1982) (capital sentence vacated because it was
imposed without consideration by sentencer of mitigating factors required by eighth
amendment); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (sentencers cannot be prevented
from considering any mitigating factor in capital sentencing proceedings).
Recently, in California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987), the Supreme Court limited the
holdings in Lockett and Eddings, however, by holding that an instruction during the sentenc-
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The Court's definition of "cruel and unusual" punishment
changes as society evolves." One way the court can measure pub-
lic attitude toward a particular sanction is by evaluating objective
data.5' The jury also serves a very important function in the eval-
uation of the legal standard of "cruel and unusual" by maintain-
ing a link between the contemporary standards of society and the
penal system." A jury choosing between life and death expresses
the beliefs of the community on the question of capital punish-
ment.' It is suggested that by excluding certain evidence from
the jury's consideration during the sentencing phase of a capital
ing phase of a capital murder trial that jurors must not be swayed by "mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or retain public feeling" did not
violate the eighth or fourteenth amendments. Id. at 840. The Court stated that such an
instruction would "serve the useful purpose of confining the jury's imposition of the death
sentence by cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors, which, we
think, would be far more likely to turn the jury against a capital defendant than for him."
Id. The Court also stated that the jury should be limited to consideration of matters that
have been introduced into evidence in order to foster the eighth amendment's require-
ment of reliability in capital sentencing and to ensure the availability of meaningful judicial
review. Id. See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976) (a procedure that lacks
standards to guide jury invites them to disregard their oaths and choose a verdict arbitrar-
ily). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) ("[t]here are some contents
in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations
of the jury system cannot be ignored.")
s" See McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1770. "[T]he Court recognized that the constitutional pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishments is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)). The Court noted that throughout
history Supreme Court decisions on the validity of certain punishments have been reflec-
tions of society's values at the time. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771.
" McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771. "In assessing contemporary values, we have eschewed
subjective judgment, and instead have sought to ascertain 'objective indicia that reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction'." Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173(1976)). The Court in McCleskey, using the framework set in Gregg, listed the indicia em-
ployed by the Court to gauge public attitude. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771. These include:
"the decisions of the state legislatures 'because the . . . legislative judgment weighs heavily
in ascertaining' contemporary standards." Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175). The past
sentencing determinations were made by juries because they are a "significant and reliable
objective index of contemporary values." Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181).
" See, e.g., McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1771 (jury is reliable index of contemporary values);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (jury sentencing in a capital case performs "an
important societal function"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (func-
tion of a jury is to serve as "link between contemporary community standards and the
penal system"). But cf. McCleskey, 107 S. Ct. at 1773 n.25 (Court has never suggested that
jury sentencing is constitutionally required in a capital case despite the function they serve)
(citing Proffit, 428 U.S. at 252.).
57 See supra note 56.
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trial,-community standards cannot properly be gauged and there-
fore the definition of the eighth amendment cannot be constitu-
tionally monitored.
VICTIM PARTICIPATION
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (Act)58 was
signed into law on October 12, 1982. The purpose of the Act,
which provides for victim impact statements, is to encourage vic-
tim participation in criminal prosecutions." Prior to this move-
ment toward victim involvement, it had frequently been noted
that the voices least heard by the criminal justice system were
those of the victims." The victim's input may be justified as repre-
sentative of the public, which has always been acknowledged as
having a proper place in the proceeding."
Victim participation is essential to the swift and effective admin-
istration of justice. 2 The justice system is improved by more "effi-
" Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3146(a),
3579, 3580 (1982)); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). The Victim and Witness Protection Act
(ACT) provides that: (1) before sentencing a criminal defendant, the judge must be in-
formed of the crime's impact on the victim, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2); (2) one who tampers
with or retaliates against a witness, victim or informant is subject to both severe criminal
sanctions and civil sanctions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1514; (3) a defendant must pay restitution
to the victim if ordered by the sentencing judge, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580; (4) the Attorney
General shall develop guidelines for the fair treatment of victims and witnesses by the
criminal justice system, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (comments); and (5) the Attorney General shall
report to Congress on the usefulness of any laws necessary to prevent federal criminals
from deriving profit from the sale of the crime story, 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (comments).
"' See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT OF 1982, S. REP.
No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2515,
2515 [hereinafter Committee Report]. The Committee Report noted that the law had not
previously provided for a Victim Impact Statement. Id. at 2517. The report stated that the
committee regarded the victim impact statement "as a first step to ensure that the victim's
side is heard and considered by adjudicative officials." Id. at 2519. Also noted in the report
was "that the definition of victims is purposely broad to include other 'indirect' victims
such as family members of homicide victims." Id. at 2519.
" See Committee Report, supra note 59, at 2516 ("[v]ictim has been 'forgotten person'
in the criminal justice system.") See also Comment, The Effect of External Pressures on Sentenc-
ing Judges, 11 FORDHAM URB L.J. 263, 275 (1982) (crime victims have traditionally been
ignored by legislators).
'1 See Committee Report, supra note 60, at 2516. "Without the cooperation of victims
and witnesses, the criminal justice system would simply cease to function and few criminals,
if any, would be brought to justice."). See also Rubel, Victim Participation in the Sentencing
Proceedings, 28 CRIM. L.Q. 226, 226 (1986) (trend toward victim participation in Canada as
well).
" See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussion of the necessity of victim partici-
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cient and effective" resolution of cases." The victim's input into
the sentencing process may be one of the best ways to clearly pre-
sent the facts to the court." It is essential not only that govern-
ment officials communicate freely and effectively with the victim
and his family but that throughout the entire proceeding atten-
tion and consideration are given to their feelings." Judges must
realize that in certain cases the best interest of all the parties in-
volved can only be served by taking serious recognition of the
victim."
Even though the VIS may appear to be more emotional or sub-
jective than factual, this does not mean that the sentencing au-
thority would be unduly influenced.6 In fact, the defense may
want to use the VIS in order to show the sentencing authority
that the victim or the victim's family is satisfied with restitution,
or that they feel some sympathy towards the defendant."
pation in the criminal proceeding). See also Committee Report, supra note 59, at 2520 (tes-
timony of Chairman of New York State's Compensation Board) ("the victim impact state-
ment will lend balance to the present information available to the court and therefore
improve the quality of justice administered by the sentencing court"); M. HYDE, THE
RIGHTS OF THE VICTIM, 61 (1983) ("Since the participation of victims and witnesses is criti-
cal to the effective administration of justice, one can easily see the importance of reducing
the problems of the victims."). See generally VIcrnM/WrrNEss ASSISTANCE PROJECT, VICTIM/
WITNESS LEGISLATION: CONSIDERATION FOR POuCv MAKERS 1981 A.B.A. Sec. Crim. Just. viii
(advantageous policy ramifications of increased victim participation).
" See supra note 62. See also E. ZEIGENHAGEN, supra note 46, at 105 (victim participation
is "an opportunity of gaining a better appreciation of contemporary norms regarding crim-
inal behavior through noting kinds of sentences that are most often acceptable to vic-
tims."); McLeod, supra note 7, at 505 ("The primary benefits of increased victim participa-
tion are expected to come from enhanced system efficiency and effectiveness, system
efficiency, simply put, refers to the processing of the maximum number of cases with mini-
mal resistance.").
£ See Rubel, supra note 61, at 236 (victim's participation plays a key role in fact finding).
" See E. ZIEGENHAGEN, supra note 46, at 92-96. Keeping doors of criminal justice system
open to victim throughout all stages of criminal prosecution increases victim understanding
and ultimately participation. Id.
See McLeod supra note 7, at 506. "This is the position advanced by the President's
Task Force on Victims of Crime: 'Two lives - the defendant's and the victim's - are pro-
foundly affected by a criminal sentence. The court cannot make an informed decision on a
just punishment if it hears from only one side.' " Id. See also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
VICTIMS OF CRIME - FOUR YEas LATER 1 (1986) (consideration of the victims' interests must
be consistent throughout the criminal proceeding; "[b]efore plea bargains are accepted,
sentences are imposed, or parole releases are granted.").
o See Rubel, supra note 61, at 236.
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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A uniform system of rules governing the substance, preparation
and presentation of VIS," would reduce any chance of undue
prejudicial influence. It is suggested that by limiting the questions
and answers to the direct effect of the crime on the victim or his
family and keeping the information included within the scope.of
the interviewee's personal knowledge and experiences any arbi-
trary or prejudicial information could be eliminated. Verification
of the VIS may operate to insure its accuracy and reliability.70 A
format designed to objectively list factors of victim impact may
serve to limit differences of victim impact statements between ju-
risdictions as well as limit any prejudicial emotional information.7 '
Although the safeguards suggested would reduce any prejudicial
element of the VIS, it is difficult to identify any potential
prejudice to the defendant from its use in light of the fact that it
does not go to the defendant's guilt or innocence but only to the
jury's choice between life imprisonment or capital punishment."
After Booth, the VIS may still have a proper role in sentencing if
it is viewed by the judge and not put before the jury.78 Allowing
only the judge to view this evidence may eliminate the discrepan-
cies between cases in which the death penalty is imposed and the
cases where it is not chosen, without eliminating individualized
See McLeod, supra note 7, at 508.
[Tlhere is minimal consensus as to (1) the procedural bases for the authorization of a
VIS, (2) the definitional criteria for what constitutes a victim for the purposes of
preparing a VIS, (3) the specifications of the necessary and allowable contents of a
VIS, (4) the authorized methods of VIS preparation, and (5) the formats for VIS
presentation.
Id.
,0 Id. at 513.
I d.
" See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (a) (1986) which provides in pertinent part:
Separate sentencing proceedings required - If a person is found guilty of murder in
the first degree, and if the state had given the notice required under section 412 (b),
a separate sentencing proceding shall be conducted as soon as practicable after the
trial has been completed to determine whether he shall be sentenced to death or
imprisoned for life.
Id.
" See supra note 58. The recently amended Victim and Witness Protection Act deals
exclusively with the judge viewing the presentence report and taking into account the
crime's impact on the victim. Id.
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sentencing."4 The resulting equality among cases imposing the
death penalty for specific crimes will dissipate any constitutional
claims that the death penalty is imposed unusually in violation of
the eighth amendment.7
Although the judge may possess the ability to view the evidence
more objectively than a jury, it is submitted that the jury should
not be totally excluded from the proceeding. An in camera inspec-
tion is suggested, allowing the judge to separately view the evi-
dence extracting all prejudicial elements before giving it to the
jury for examination."
CONCLUSION
Victims should be informed about, and involved in, the criminal
justice process." Although some information contained in the
VIS in Booth was prejudicial to the defendant, that should not
have totally invalidated their use at all capital sentencing proceed-
ings. This article has examined several advantages to encouraging
the victim to participate in the criminal justice process. One of the
best methods for increasing victim participation is the use of the
VIS. It is now clear that the majority's holding excluding all vic-
tim impact statements from capital sentencing proceedings is both
dangerous and unnecessary. In capital cases it is imperative that
all relevant evidence be admitted for consideration by the sentenc-
" See McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1777 n.35 (1987). But see id. at 1778 ("any
mode for determining guilt or punishment 'has its weaknesses and the potential for mis-
use.' ") (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)).
I Id. at 1778 n.36.
See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2641 (1986) (victim's statements made
prior to trial suppressed after judge made in camera examination and found them too prej-
udicial). See generally FED. R. EvID. 612 (court shall examine evidence in camera to deter-
mine relevance).
77 See Hyde, supra note 62, at 62. There is a present movement of many criminal justice
agencies toward a better system of informing the victim about all stages of the proceeding.
Id.
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ing authority for the decision to be made is truly one of life and
death.
Jean Marie Schieler
